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The Restatements of the American Law Institute inevitably contain
many statements of rules of law where the authorities are divided, and where
the propriety of the rule stated may be open to dispute. The justification for
such a rule must, in the long run, depend upon its intrinsic merit, and the
fact that a critic expresses disagreement with it does not necessarily call for
a reply from those responsible for the Restatement. But when a writer
whose position might justify a belief in his accuracy misrepresents, however
innocently, the effect of a section of the Restatement, the case is different.
Others may be deceived.
Such a misrepresentation occurs in Professor Laube's article on the
right of a defaulting employee to recover for benefits conferred, which
appeared in the May number of this REVIEW.1 In that article, the author
refers to Section 270 of the Restatement of Contracts, which provides, in
effect, that where the promise of one party to an ordinary bilateral contract
requires performance "extending over a period of time and fulfilment of
the promise of the other party does not, the duty to fulfil the latter promise
is except as stated in § 268 (2) 2 conditional on the completion of the for-
mer, if the contract does not indicate the contrary by fixing dates or other-
wise." Professor Laube assumes that this section involves the conclusion
that, unless the condition is performed, an employee can recover nothing.
He says:
"To illustrate the application of the condition precedent, the Restate-
ment invokes the employee as its victim. Its comment tells us that
'Centuries ago the practice became settled that where work
is to be done by one party to the contract, and payment is to be
made by the other, the performance of the work, when no rela-
tive times for the performances are specified in the contract, must
precede the payment. . .
'Centuries ago' must have been in the age of feudalism. If not, at
least that orthodox principle of contracts antedates the democratic move-
ment of the last century." 3
t Reporter, RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs (1932); Dane Professor of Law, Harvard Uni-
versity.
i. Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-viewed (935) 83 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 825.
2. This exception covers the case where there has been substantial performance.
3. Laube, supra note i, at 843.
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The writer's error of supposing that, because a condition in a contract
is not fulfilled, there necessarily can be no recovery quasi-contractually 4 is
surprising because, I presume, Professor Laube would allow recovery by the
employee even though the contract expressly said that the employer would
pay wages only if the employee worked the full time. The development of
modern law has been in allowing quasi-contractual recovery, where it is just
to do so, in spite of conditions in a contract, not in denying the existence
of conditions plainly expressed or implied.
In fact, the section of the Restatement states a rule that is everywhere
law-that under such a contract as is there referred to, payment is due after
performance, not before it. What are the rights of an employee if the con-
dition is not fulfilled is set forth in Section 357, which states that recovery
of any benefit conferred may be had
"if (a) the plaintiff's breach or non-performance is not wilful and
deliberate; or
(b) the defendant, with knowledge that the plaintiff's breach of
duty or non-performance of condition has occurred or will thereafter
occur, assents to the rendition of the part performance, or accepts the
benefit of it, or retains property received although its return in specie
is still not unreasonably difficult or injurious."
This rule is not as liberal as that for which Professor Laube contends,
but it is far different from that which he represents the Restatement as lay-
ing down.
Professor Laube's error in regard to the meaning of Section 27o, and
his oversight of Section 357, though unjustifiable, were evidently inadvert-
ent, and I should have supposed that he would have wished himself to make
the needed correction. But on my suggesting to him the propriety of so
doing, he declined to correct the error, though he did not deny its existence,
on the ground that the general tenor of the argument in his article was not
affected and that he disagreed with the rule stated in Section 357.
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When my article on The Defaulting Employee appeared last May in this
REVIEW, Professor Williston protested that I was laboring under a misap-
prehension as to the meaning of Section 270 of the Restatement of Contracts
and after attempting to point out the error that he thought I had made, sug-
gested the propriety of my "retracting or qualifying" my criticism of the
Restatement. He was immediately advised that the only error that I had
t Author of The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re-ziewed (1935) 83 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 825; Professor of Law, Cornell University.
4. The same error is made on page 826.
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made was one of inadvertent omission in failing to cite Section 357. Since
that section denies recovery to the employee who wilfully defaults, it merely
sustains, by specific reference, the validity of my criticism.
My critic says that Section 270 of the Restatement of Contracts sim-
ply means that when an employer engages an employee to do a piece of work
for him, he does not pay him in advance. The performance of the work
must precede the payment. Clearly that is a "condition precedent." The
commentator of this section tells us that, apart from any intention of the
parties, due to centuries of practice, the law imposes this "constructive con-
dition" in deference to this custom. However my critic may rationalize this
section historically, it was this "old and deep-rooted principle" that per-
formance must precede payment upon which the courts relied when they
denied to the wilful defaulter any recovery for part performance. Yet, my
critic says that it is Section 357, and not Section 270, that controls the matter
with which my article deals because it prescribes what happens when the
contract is broken.
Under Section 357 of the Restatement, the employee who wilfully de-
faults is denied recovery. His wilful non-performance bars his remedy.
Under Section 270, the employee has no right to payment until he has per-
formed, because centuries of practice have generated a constructive condi-
dition that performance must precede payment. Since my article dealt
chiefly with the historical doctrine of the condition precedent, which barred
the remedy of the wilfully defaulting employee by denying him any right
because his performance was a condition precedent to payment by his em-
ployer, my critic says that Section 357, and not Section 270, of the Restate-
ment applies.
Most professors of Contracts would probably admit, as some of the
annotators of Section 270 do, that Section 270 makes the contract entire.
How strange to have my critic condemn me for assailing the "no right" sec-
tion of the Restatement on the ground that I should have confined myself to
the "no remedy" section! Such compartmental isolation of thought is a
distinguished analytical achievement. A realist would have said that if non-
performance under Section 357 bars the remedy of an employee who delib-
erately defaults, and performance under Section 270 is a condition prece-
dent to his right of payment, then the two sections must have been dealing
functionally with different aspects of the same thing. A wilfully defaulting
employee would be justified, in view of the injustice which the Restatement
inflicts upon him, in being just as profane when his attorney advises him
that he has "no right" under Section 270 as when he is advised that he has
"no remedy" under Section 357.
I am no dialectician but it seems to me that the real is the rational. If
a wilful employee can not recover because of non-performance of a condi-
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tion (Section 357), it seems to me that it is the condition (Section 270)
which is the obstacle to his recovery. If that position is sound, my refusal
to retract seems justified. My critic requested me to reflect upon my mis-
apprehension, with the prophecy that through that magic process I would
soon agree with him. The analytical devotion necessary to that consum-
mation repels me. Even now, my heart is murmuring, "God forbid. I
want to be a realist." May my prayer not be regarded as contemptuous, as
my critic regarded my article, even though it may reflect upon certain sections
of the Restatement or the interpretation of them.
To express my well-founded convictions, although adverse to the Re-
statement, in the columns of this REVIEW seems to me not only a privilege
but a duty. If the honor of that opportunity is extended to me in the future,
I shall strive to merit it. But, if any critic should ask me to retract because
he refuses to note the plural effects of any principle of law, my refusal will
be adamantine, however eminent my critic may be.
